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JOINT FIGHTING AGAINST CARTEL PRACTICES 
 IN THE MEMBER STATES OF THE REGIONAL ECONOMIC ZONE 
 
Abstract: 
In general term, cartel is considered as a form of agreement between competitors in a similar industry 
whose purpose is for maximizing profit only for the members of cartel. The competition authority of 
Indonesia, Commission for the Supervision of Business Competition (KPPU), is now vigorously 
fighting against cartel practices in various business fields. There are several principle considerations 
regarding the establishment of cartel, such as the mechanism of how the cartel works, how to reveal the 
cartel, and the impact for the competition as well as for the consumers. These understandings are 
needed in order to handle cartel practices appropriately, both from the aspect of prevention as well as 
law enforcement. Preventive action is carried out by establishing rules and policies whose purpose is 
for giving a limitations regarding the permissible or impermissible actions when the business actors of 
similar business gather, as is usually organized by any trade associations. Repressive action, as an 
action to make deterrent effect, can be executed by penalizing them a significant fine, even by a 
criminal threat. Most of all countries that are doing an action to fight against cartel will face various 
obstacles and challenges in order to overcome this practice. The states which are incorporated in a 
regional economic zone, such as Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), have performed a 
cooperative action that agrees together to fight against cartel. This cooperation is executed by doing 
strategic steps from the level of investigation, starting from detecting, doing a pre-investigation 
appraisal, investigation planning and resourcing, as well as making strategies for investigation progress 
and preparing written recommendations. One of the efforts in order to handle cartel practices which is 
regarded efficient enough is called leniency program, where the Indonesian parliament is still drafting 




Cartel activities in strategic sectors have been raising new issues recently in 
view of the mechanism by which cartels operate, the proving process, and the 
integrated approach in addressing cartels, both internally with regards to law 
enforcement agencies, as well as externally involving international cooperation.  The 
mechanism of cartel operations is pointing towards one common feature, namely that 
cartels are conducted by business actors of similar types belonging to a trade 
association, for the purpose of maximizing profits based on written or tacit agreement. 
The existence of such tacit agreement can be considered as a new phenomenon in the 
proving process using indirect evidence or circumstantial evidence.  
The objective of cartel practices is to maximize profits by way of influencing 
prices by making arrangements for the production and/or marketing of goods and/or 
services, thus leading to monopolistic practices and/or unfair business competition.1 
In general, the characteristics of cartel agreements are distinct from other trade 
restriction agreements, particularly with regards to their form, namely the former tend 
to be in the form of tacit agreements. Cartel members tend to pose limitations with the 
objective of generating supra competitive profits.2  
Several decisions of the competition authority in Indonesia, namely Komisi 
Pengawas Persaingan Usaha (Commission for the Supervision of Business 
Competition, hereinafter briefly referred to as KPPU) concerning cooking oil cartel3, 
                                                 
1Article 11 of Law No. 5/1999:  Business actors shall be prohibited from entering into agreements 
with their business competitors, with the intention of influencing prices by arranging the production 
and or marketing of certain goods and or services, which can cause monopolistic practices and or unfair 
business competition.  [Unofficial translation] 
2Mario Monti, “Why should we be concerned with cartels and collusive behavior?”, (Göteborg: 
Elanders Graphic Systems, 2001), p. 15. 
3KPPU Decision in Case No. 24/KPPU-I/2009 concerning Cooking Oil Price Fixing.    
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fuel surcharge cartel4, anti-hypertension medicine cartel5, garlic cartel6, car tyre cartel7, 
poultry cartel8, and imported beef cartel9 have in all instances resulted in excessive 
prices and have thus unfavorably impacted consumers. Bearing in mind the impact of 
cartels, KPPU has been conducting supervision and law enforcement in accordance 
with Law Number Year 1999 concerning the Prohibition of Monopolistic Practices 
and Unfair Business Competition (hereinafter referred to as the Anti-Monopoly Law). 
It is line with the objective of the Anti-Monopoly Law, namely ensuring public 
interest and enhancing the efficiency of national economy as part of the endeavors to 
improve the people’s welfare.10 
The issue currently being faced by KPPU is when it decides to prove the 
existence of a collusive agreement by using indirect evidence. The reason for 
choosing the said mechanism for proving a cartel is, among things, the fact that such 
agreements are generally entered into tacitly.  In addition, KPPU does not have the 
authority to conduct search and seizure of documents as an investigator would have. 
In several cases, the courts of law as the appeals judicature for KPPU decisions, found 
it difficult to accept indirect evidence which includes evidence of communication and 
economic proof, thus frequently leading to the cancellation of KPPU decisions KPPU 
in cartel cases.  
Anti-cartel measures have been undertaken internally at the national level in the 
respective countries, as well as globally among member states of economic regions 
engaging in cooperation in combating cartels. Member states of the European 
economic region are an example of comprehensive cooperation, as they have a 
business competition authority for the territory of the European common market, 
namely the European Competition Commission (hereinafter referred to as ECC), 
which has supervisory and law enforcement functions. The said commission was 
established for the purpose of implementing Article 101 of the Treaty among member 
states of the European Union in effect since 1958, which is primarily aimed at 
regulating antitrust, mergers, cartels, and state aid.11  
Law enforcement issues arising in view of cartel prohibitions in the European 
Union have been generally related to the high level of fines on the one hand and the 
application of immunity under the leniency program on the other.12 Since its first 
                                                 
4KPPU Decision in Case No. 25/KPPU-I/2009 concerning Fuel Surcharge Price Fixing in the 
Domestic Aviation Industry. 
5KPPU Decision in Case No. 17/KPPU-I/2010 concerning the Class Therapy Pharmaceutical 
Industry for Amlodipine. 
6KPPU Decision  in Case No. 05/KPPU-I/2013 concerning the Violation of Article 11, Article 19 
sub-article c and Article 24 of Law Number 5 Year 1999 concerning the Import of Garlic 
7KPPU Decision in Case No. 08/KPPU-I/2014 Automotive Industry related to the Four-Wheeled 
Vehicles Tyre Cartel. 
8KPPU Decision in Case No. 02/KPPU-I/2016 concerning the Alleged Violation of Article 11 of 
Law Number 5 Year 1999 related to the Regulation of Broiler Seedling Production.  
9KPPU Decision  in Case No. 10/KPPU-I/2015 concerning the Alleged Violation of Article 11 
and Article 19 sub-article c of Law Number 5 Year 1999 concerning the Prohibition of Monopolistic 
Practices and Unfair Business Competition in the Trade of Imported Beef in Jakarta, Bogor, Depok, 
Tangerang, and Bekasi (Jabodetabek). 
10Article 3 sub-article a) of Law No. 5/1999. 
11Anonymous, “European Competition Policy”, Economics Online (News Analysis Theory 
Comment) 
http://www.economicsonline.co.uk/Business_economics/European_competition_policy.html, accessed  
March 11, 2017. 
12Alexander Italianer, “Fighting Cartels In Europe And The US: Different Systems, Common 
Goals”, Annual Conference of the International Bar Association (IBA), Boston, October 9, 2013.  
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Decision on cartels in 1969, the ECC has imposed a total of over €19 billion on 820 
companies. The amount of fine has been calculated based on the percentage of the 
value of annual turnover of the company concerned, pursuant to the provisions in the 
Guidelines on Fines of 2006.13 
The economic regional area covered by the Association of South East Asia 
Nations (hereinafter referred to as ASEAN) has stepped up economic cooperation 
within the ASEAN Economic Community (hereinafter referred to as AEC). The AEC 
has agreed to introduce business competition policies and legislation at the nation 
level in the respective member states by the year 2015, as well as to achieve the 
objectives of the ASEAN Economic Blueprint. Domestic as well as multinational 
companies conducting their business activities in the ASEAN region have been under 
constant pressure to comply with competition laws in the jurisdiction of the country in 
which they run their operations. It poses certain challenges on the companies 
concerned, considering the diverse business competition law provisions in each 
respective country.  
ASEAN member states have taken a step towards strengthening cooperation in 
the field of competition policy and law by establishing the Experts Group on 
Competition (hereinafter AEGC). AEGC is a committee formed to oversee the 
development of competition law and policy in ASEAN. It is expected that by 
strengthening regional cooperation at the level of ASEAN competition authorities of 
member states will be able to share information concerning cartel and anti-
competitive practices within such area. That being the case, companies are bound to 
face further challenges particularly in cartel investigations which are based on various 
different competition laws; for instance, not all member states have legal provisions 
concerning the Leniency Program, some jurisdictions treat it as criminal act. Faced 
with the diversity of the manner in which ASEAN countries deal with cartels, 
companies need to determine their compliance policy in each jurisdiction respectively, 
without constraining themselves by rigid implementation.14 Based on the foregoing, 
the author has conducted a study on the prohibition of cartels, the impacts thereof, as 
well as the joint efforts for combating cartels undertaken by states in certain economic 
regions, specifically in ASEAN. Considering that dealing with cartels is a relatively 
new area of cooperation in the ASEAN region, the manner in which cartels are 
addressed and the form of cooperation among member states in this economic region 
need to be reviewed.  
 
B. The Mechanism for Dealing with Cartels and Joint Efforts to Combat Cartels 
in Member States of an Economic Region 
Economic cooperation at the level of ASEAN within the AEC includes several 
elements such as (i) a single market and production base, (ii) a highly competitive 
economic region, (iii) a region of equitable economic development, and (iv) a region 
fully integrated into the global economy. In the AEC Blueprint, competition policy is 
identified as the keyword for creating “a highly competitive economic region”. Such 
objective is to be achieved gradually by the year 2015. Such accomplishment in the 
                                                 
13Ibid. 
14Gerald Singham, et. al., “Competition Laws in ASEAN-Overview of The Main Prohibitions”, 
Competition Law Alert, June 2013, 
file:///C:/Users/anna%20maria/Downloads/Competition%20Law%20in%20ASEAN%20(2). Pdf, 
accessed March 5, 2017. 
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area of business competition is marked by the finalization of guidelines under the title 
Guidelines on Developing Core Competencies Policy and Law for ASEAN.15 Chapter 
3.2 of the said guidelines sets out the prohibition of anti-competitive agreements, 
among other things cartels. The discussion on efforts for combating cartels in member 
states in areas of economic regions consists of several sub-topics, namely 1) the 
reason for the need to combat cartel practices in strategic industries; 2) the legal 
mechanism for combating cartels in areas of economic regions; 3) potential 
challenges in establishing mechanisms for joint efforts for combating cartel practices. 
 
1. The underlying rationale of the Prohibition of Cartels under Competition 
Policy and Law  
Cartel practices are defined as “A combination of producer of any product 
joined together to control its productions, sale and price, so as to obtain a monopoly 
and restrict competition in any particular industry or commodity”.16  As the said 
definition suggests, cartel practices can be conducted by any producers and for any 
type of products, ranging from products for primary to tertiary needs. Cartel practices 
in any form are bound to end up in creating a condition that is harmful to consumers. 
Cartels prevent the opportunity for innovation or the entry of companies (new comers) 
which can offer better prices and services. Also, quite frequently cartel practices 
prevent other companies (new comers) from offering better production systems, 
which could potentially lead to more efficient (lower) prices. Cartels in general have 
the objective of obtaining excessive profits by determining supra competitive prices. 
In view of the massive impact of cartels, all business competition laws prohibit cartels; 
in fact, some countries treat it as a criminal act.  
The prohibition of cartels is provided for in several articles, such as Article 5, 
Article 9, Article 11, and Article 22 of Law Number 5 Year 1999 concerning the 
Prohibition of Monopolistic Practices and Unfair Business Competition (hereinafter 
referred to as Law No. 5/1999).17 KPPU’s decisions concerning cartel practices in 
several strategic sectors (such as garlic, tires for four-wheeled vehicles, poultry, 
import of beef, and even motor vehicles) catering to the needs of many people in the 
community indicate the same common pattern of behavior, namely that such 
agreements are entered into verbally and secretly within a trade association. The 
technique applied by KPPU to reveal and prove such agreements by using indirect 
evidence initially raised intensive debate among legal academic circles and observers; 
however, at the appeal level the District Court affirmed KPPU’s Decision in the four-
wheeled vehicle tyre cartel case. Indirect evidence was used in the absence of KPPU’s 
authority to seize or search cartel related documents. Apart from the above, under the 
provisions prohibiting cartels in Law No. 5/1999 KPPU is obligated to use the rule of 
reason approach, which requires further economic analysis in order to prove whether 
or not there is excessive price or profit resulting in harm to consumers.18 
                                                 
15Cassey Lee and Yoshifumi Fukunaga, “ASEAN Regional Cooperation on Competition Policy”, 
ERIA Discussion Paper Series, http://www.eria.org/ERIA-DP-2013-03.pdf.  
16Henry Campbell Black, M. A, Black's Law Dictionary (St. Paul, Minn.: West Publishing Co. 
1968). 
17Refer to Article 5, Article 9, Article 11 and Article 22 of Law No. 5/1999. 
18OECD, “Prosecuting Cartels Without Direct Evidence”, DAF/COMP/GF(2006)7, September 11, 
2006, https://www.oecd.org/daf/competition/prosecutionandlawenforcement/37391162.pdf, accessed 
17 March 2017, “…Circumstantial evidence is employed in cartel cases in all countries. The better 
practice is to use circumstantial evidence holistically, giving it cumulative effect, rather than on an 
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Parallel to the development of handling cartels in Indonesia, ASEAN member 
states have also been making endeavors towards the establishment of cooperation in 
the fight against cartels. The embryo of cooperation in the area of competition policy 
and law was marked by, among other things, the establishment of the AEGC (ASEAN 
Experts Group on Competition).19 ASEAN member states which had adopted the 
AEC Blueprint in 2007 made a commitment to promote competition policy and law in 
all ASEAN member states by the year 2015.20 Further development of cooperation 
was marked by the establishment of Guidelines on Developing Core Competencies 
Policy and Law for ASEAN Regional Guidelines on Competition Policy in 2010 
serving as a priority for AEGC. 21  Subsequently, at a meeting in Bangkok on 
November 28-29, 2012 the said document was finalized under the title Guidelines on 
Developing Core Competencies Policy and Law for ASEAN.22  
For the purpose of implementing the above mentioned Regional Guidelines, 
member states agreed to articulate the same in the form of government policy in order 
to bring immediate impact on the conduct of companies and the structure of industry 
in the respective national markets. In principle, competition policy includes two 
primary elements; first, the adoption of a series of policies to promote competition; 
second, the adoption of legislation (in the form of laws, court decisions and 
implementing regulations) aimed at controlling or prohibiting anti-competitive 
practices. 23  The Regional Guidelines are based on the experience of individual 
countries as well as international best practices. Such Guidelines provide for various 
policy and institutional choices which can serve as guidelines for ASEAN Member 
States (hereinafter referred to as AMSs) in the context of endeavors towards creating 
an environment for fair business competition. The Guidelines are expected to raise 
awareness among AMSs about the significance of competition policy, aimed at 
encouraging development and enhancing cooperation among AMSs.  
In general, the Guidelines set out provisions concerning the objective of 
establishing the guidelines, the benefits of competition policy, the scope of 
competition policy and law (hereinafter referred to as CPL), the role and 
responsibility of competition authorities, law enforcement powers, due process of law, 
technical assistance and capacity building, advocacy, and international cooperation in 
the area of competition in the context of free trade agreements (hereinafter referred to 
as FTAs). The Guidelines adopted in August 2010 provide for three primary 
prohibitions, namely (i) anticompetitive agreements; (ii) abuse of a dominant position; 
and (iii) anticompetitive mergers (and acquisitions). However, neither the EC 
                                                                                                                                            
item-by-item basis. Complicating the use of circumstantial evidence are provisions in national 
competition laws that variously define the nature of agreements that are subject to the law...” 
19Anonymous, “ASEAN Experts Group on Competition”, http://www.asean-competition.org/aegc, 
accessed March 16, 2017. 
20Daren Shiau and Elsa Chen, “ASEAN Developments in Merger Control”, Journal of European 
Competition Law & Practice, Vol. 5, No. 3, p. 149, 2014.  
21 ASEAN Secretariat, “ASEAN Regional Guidelines on Competition Policy”, 2010. The 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) was established on 8 August 1967. “…The Member 
States of the Association are Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Indonesia, Lao PDR, Malaysia, Myanmar, 
Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Viet Nam. The ASEAN Secretariat is based in Jakarta, 
Indonesia...” 
22 The 6th ASEAN Competition Conference, 27-28 July 2016, Bangkok, Thailand. 
http://asean.org/asean-combat-cartels-region/ accessed 12 March 2017. See also M. Muchtar Rivai and 
Darwin Erhandy, “Kebijakan dan Hukum Persaingan Usaha Yang Sehat: Sinergitas Kawasan ASEAN 
di Era Globalisasi”, [“Fair Business Competition Policy and Law: Synergy in the ASEAN Region in 
the Era of Globalization”], Jurnal Liquidity, vol. 2, No. 2, July-December 2013, p.199-200. 
23ASEAN Secretariat, Loc. Cit.  
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Blueprint nor the ASEAN Regional Guidelines on Competition have a binding effect 
on the respective member states.24  
 
2. Cartel Provisions in Members States of an Economic Region 
There are significant distinctions between the European Union as an economic 
region and ASEAN, particularly viewed from the normative aspect. With regards to 
the European Union’s normative effect, it is considered to be an agent of 
“Europeanization outside of the European Union”, and as an endeavor to exercise 
political influence within its members states. In contrast to the above, ASEAN’s 
normative role is regarded as a process of dialogue which focuses on the important 
role of negotiation and renegotiation. Unlike the European Union with its hegemonic 
approach, ASEAN appears to be reluctant to distance itself from the non-interference 
doctrine attaching to itself the title of “ASEAN Talk Shop”. 25  Similarly, in the 
context of implementing competition policy and law, the European Union places 
greater emphasis on national law making through negotiations and understandings.  
In dealing with cartels, each AMS prohibits anticompetitive agreements through 
various mechanisms, both from the aspect of regulatory framework as well as 
institutional powers.  Cartel related provisions include several substantive CPL 
elements in each member state, namely provisions prohibiting cartels, the competence 
of competition authorities, and due process of law. Following is an overview of the 
distinctive features of cartel regulations in several ASEAN Member States. 
The prohibition of cartels in Indonesia is covered by the criteria for prohibited 
agreements, which includes cartel prices (Article 5 and Article 11), non-price cartels 
(Article 4, Article 9 and Article 12), and conspiracy (Article 22 up to Article 24) of 
Law No. 5/1999. In dealing with cases of anti-competitive practices in Indonesia, bid 
rigging cases have dominated law enforcement statistics since the establishment of 
KPPU in 2000. Following is a diagram of the development KPPU decisions indicating 
a total of 189 decisions (70%) concerning bid rigging and a total of 80 decisions 
(30%) concerning non-bid rigging cases. In addition to bid rigging cases,26 KPPU 
decisions include abuse of dominant position cases, as well as cases of other 
prohibited agreements such as exclusive dealing (tying or bundling), vertical 
integration, and cartel. Prominent hard-core cartel cases have come to public attention 
recently, as cartel agreements have been occur in important sectors such as garlic, 
four-wheeled vehicle tires, poultry, beef import, and price fixing for motorbikes. All 
of such cartel cases were initiated through KPPU investigations, with the exception of 
bid rigging cases which were generally based on reports from the public. In handling 
such cases, KPPU determines whether there has been a violation in the form of a 
cartel agreement, which is subject to a fine of not less than IDR1 billion and not more 
than IDR25 billion. KPPU’s decision is final and binding to the extent that there is no 
appeal filed with the District Court and no cassation is filed with the Supreme Court.  
The mechanism for proving cartels by using circumstantial (indirect) evidence 
consists of proof of communication and economic proof, whereby such proving 
mechanism has frequently raised sharp debate among practitioners and legal 
                                                 
24Daren Shiau and Elsa Chen, Op. Cit., p.150. 
25Jiajie He, “Normative Power in the EU and ASEAN: Why They Diverge”, International Studies 
Review (2016) 18, p. 92. 
26Article 22 of Law No. 5/1999 provides that “Business actors shall be prohibited from conspiring 
with other parties with the aim of determining the awardees of tenders which may cause unfair business 
competition.” [Unofficial translation] 
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observers.27 In almost all of the cartel cases handled by KPPU cartel agreements are 
proven using circumstantial evidence, as no written agreement has been found in any 
of them. The difficulty in finding cartel agreements is due to the fact, among other 
things, that KPPU lacks the authority to seize or search related documents or 
correspondence. In addition to that, Law No. 5/1999 does not provide for leniency 
program which would enable cartel perpetrators to confess their actions by obtaining 
whistle-blower immunity in return for their willingness to provide information and 
data about the ongoing cartel activities. The proposal for amendment of provisions on 
KPPU’s authority to conduct investigation and to grant relief through the leniency 
program in its capacity as the adjudicating institution, as well as the amount of 
administrative fines is currently in the process of being considered by the House of 
Representatives of the Republic of Indonesia. Up to the present time, Indonesia is still 
“wrestling” with cartels and all of the risks involved, as cartels are generally 
perpetrated by large companies or companies that possess facilities through 
government regulation.  
Competition provisions in Thailand are set out in The Trade Competition Act 
B.E 2542 enacted in 1999 (Competition Act, B.E. 2542). Cartel practices are explicitly 
prohibited in Section 25 and Section 27. Section 25 prohibits agreements for price 
fixing, both for predatory pricing as well as excessive pricing, barrier to entry, and 
other acts restring trade. At the same time, Section 27 prohibits price fixing as well as 
fixing the volume of sales and/or purchases, the division of market territory, as well as 
bid rigging. The competition authority is the Office of Competition Commission 
(hereinafter referred to as OCC) established at the Ministry of Trade, which has the 
authority to give recommendations, notifications, to summon related parties for 
clarification, to consider pressing criminal charges based on reports by parties 
suffering damage as a result of unfair competition practices.28 The above described 
function is implemented by the Commission and the Appeal Committee or Sub-
Committee appointed by the OCC. Upon the instruction of the OCC, appeals must be 
filed with the Appeals Committee by the relevant parties within thirty days as from 
the date of being notified about such instruction of the OCC. The Appeals Committee 
is required to set forth the rules and procedure for appeals in the Government 
Gazette). 
Provisions on the prohibition of cartels in Vietnam are set forth in the Law on 
Competition adopted by Parliament on December 3, 2004, which came into effect as 
from July 1, 2005. It was subsequently followed by the issuance of several 
implementing regulations in the form of Government Regulations. Provisions for the 
prohibition of agreements in restraint of competition are set out in Article 8 and 
Article 9. The competition authority in Vietnam is the Administrative Body for 
Competition (hereinafter referred to as ABC) which has the authority to oversee 
market concentration, to receive jurisdiction for exceptions, to investigate competition 
cases related to practices restraining competition and unfair competition practices, to 
impose fines, and to undertake other actions in accordance with applicable law.29 
Another relevant institution is the Competition Council (hereinafter referred to as CC), 
namely a body set up by the government consisting of 11-15 members appointed and 
dismissed by the Prime Minister at the recommendation of the Minister of Trade.30 
The Chairperson of CC makes a decision on the formation of a tribunal for handling 
                                                 
27 KPPU Regulation Number 4 Year 2011 concerning Guidelines on Article 5 (Price Fixing). 
28 See Section 18 of Competition Act, B.E. 2542. 
29Article 49 of the Competition Law of Vietnam. 
30Article 53 of the Competition Law of Vietnam. 
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competition cases, which consists of not less than five CC members, one of which is 
to preside over the investigation proceeding for resolving competition cases.  
The competition authority of Singapore based on the Competition Act is the 
Competition Commission of Singapore (CCS) which has the capacity to sue or to be 
sued in cases of unfair competition. The main function of the CCS is to promote 
efficient market behavior, by maintaining productivity and competitive culture, 
raising awareness among government agencies concerning competition policy, as well 
as other functions including perform such other functions and discharge such other 
duties as may be conferred on the Commission by or under any other written law.31 
There are explicit provisions prohibiting cartels in Article 34 which in principle 
prohibits concerted practices for fixing prices or sales, controlling production or 
supplies, engage in discriminatory conduct in business transactions and in unfair trade 
practices.  
Cartel and bid rigging prohibitions in Malaysia are set out in Part II concerning 
Anti Competitive Practices, Chapter I concerning Anti Competitive Agreements, 
Clause (Article) 4 concerning the Prohibition of Horizontal and Vertical Agreements 
of Act 712 Competition Act 2010. As for the investigation process, it is provided for 
in Part III concerning Investigation and Enforcement, Clause 14 up to Clause 34. 
Provisions on the competition authority are set out in Part IV concerning The 
Malaysian Competition Commission (hereinafter referred to as MyCC), while Part V 
provides for the Competition Appeal Tribunal. MyCC has the authority to conduct 
investigation and to determine whether the Competition Act 2010 has been violated, 
being subject to a fine of not more 10% of the company’s overall turnover during the 
period in which such violation occurred.32 The said Act also provides for leniency 
program in the form of punishment leniency for perpetrators of cartel by reducing the 
fine up to 100% of the fine/penalty that should have been originally imposed. Such 
leniency is granted if the relevant party is willing to cooperate in identification and 
investigation from the time at which the violation of the Act is found.  
Similar to Malaysia’s competition provisions, Brunei Darussalam has also 
adopted competition regulations under the Constitution of Brunei Darussalam (Order 
Made under Article 83(3) Competition Order, in 2015. Prohibited agreements are 
provided for in Chapter II including agreements restraining or distorting competition. 
The said law also provides for leniency program.  
Myanmar began the process of adopting competition rules under The 
Competition Law (The Pyidaungsu Hluttaw Law No.9, 2015) The 7th Waxing Day of 
Taboung, 1376 M.E (February 24, 2015). The competition authority in Myanmar is 
the Myanmar Competition Commission which consists of “an appropriate person of 
Union level as a Chairman, professionals and suitable persons from the relevant 
Union Ministries, government departments, government organizations and 
nongovernmental organizations as members…”. The powers of the Myanmar 
Competition Commission is provided for in Chapter V concerning the Power and 
Duties of The Commission, which basically consists of engaging in cooperation and 
coordination internationally, in regional organizations or bilateral relations concerning 
competition matters, applying exceptions for the interest of the state or small and 
medium enterprises, forming committees and working groups, determining market 
share and the volume of supply of companies under investigation, conducting 
                                                 
31Article 6 of the Competition Act of 2004, Functions and Duties of Commission. 
32Clause 40 of Finding of an Infringement of Competition Act 2010. 
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investigation and collecting instruments of evidence, summoning the parties 
concerned and conducting discussions with experts, seizing documents as evidence, 
examine documentary evidence and initiating prosecution if needed, providing 
leniency to perpetrators prior to pressing charges against them at court, and providing 
advice to the government. As for cartels, they are in principle provided for in Chapter 
VII concerning Act of Restraint on Competition, including price fixing for purchase 
as well as sale prices, agreements restraining competition, controlling production, and 
bid rigging.  
All of the above described components are preventive measures in combating 
cartels in the form of laws and implementing regulations, supervisory authorities, as 
well as rules of procedure. The next level of such endeavors include building synergy, 
or at at least mutually beneficial harmonization among AMSs raising awareness of the 
harmful effects of cartel practices on the community. 
 
3. Cooperation in Combating Cartels in the ASEAN Region 
In the current era of trade globalization, cooperation among countries in 
economic regions is increasingly becoming an option, including in conducting 
international cartel investigations. Countries in the European economic region are one 
of the examples of a region progressively engaging in regional cooperation by 
adopting supra-national provisions based on a Treaty applicable to all member 
states.33 Viewed from the aspect of historical and regulatory background in the area of 
competition, ASEAN is facing a rather different situation. From the legal historical 
point of view, competition law and policy in ASEAN Member States are highly 
diverse, with respect to the time of formation of law enforcement institutions and 
implementation of the law, the organizational structure of institutions, as well as the 
substantive provisions of the rules specifically prohibiting cartels.  
The existing diversity of historical background and legislation raise various 
issues requiring harmonization of implementation at the regional level in the future. 
One of the central issues is the divergence of legal systems supporting enforcement 
and the diversity of the organizational structure of competition authorities with 
jurisdiction in their respective countries. Other significant risks emerging in multi-
jurisdictional cases are related to the due process of law and the disclosure of 
confidential information.34  
In the context of cooperation in economic regions, it is likely to be easier to 
build synergy in merger review as compared to joint efforts for combating cartels.  It 
is due to the divergent nature of investigation each of the said areas entail respectively, 
namely the party under investigation in cartel cases is a party alleged of having 
violated the law, while merger review is concerned about the fulfillment of the 
authorization process involved. There are at least three important points that need to 
be duly noted in the context of joint investigations of cartels, namely as follows:  
a) Application of the principle of comity or the mutual respect among 
countries;  
                                                 
33Article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). Market dominance, 
or preventing the abuse of firms' dominant market positions under Article 102 TFEU. Mergers, control 
of proposed mergers, acquisitions and joint ventures involving companies that have a certain, defined 
amount of turnover in the EU, according to the Merger Regulation.  
34 OECD, “Improving International Co-operation in Cartel Investigations”, Global Forum on 
Competition, November 30, 2012, p.1.   
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b) Instruments used jointly, in the form of rules concerning joint cartel 
investigation procedure and mechanism, as well as effectiveness of the same 
during a specific time period; 
c) The form of competition authority which possesses the powers, competence 
and independence to overcome the jurisdiction of other member states in 
implementing its authorities and functions. 
 
The comity principle can be effectively applied through harmonization among 
member states in the region concerned.35 The purpose of harmonizing the regulatory 
framework is to seek commonalities among the diverse legal systems of member 
states, subsequently taking steps to complement the same thus resulting in 
comprehensive regulations. For such purpose, a combined method of informal and 
formation cooperation among competition authorities can be adopted. Informal 
cooperation can include exchange of information, sharing knowledge, and strategies 
for investigation, witness evaluation, market information, or any other matters 
beneficial for streamlining and directing the investigation process.36 
At the same time, formal cooperation can begin with memorandum of 
understanding setting out agreements concerning ways of handling cartels at the 
regional level. Many countries entering into bilateral agreements include provisions 
concerning the coordination of parallel investigations, exchange of information, 
consultations or exchange of staff between competition authorities. 37  It is then 
escalated to the next level in the form of rules which must be complied with by all 
member states. It is certainly more easily achieved when all member states already 
have similar regulations in place and share a common understanding of the hazards 
caused by cartel practices. The application of the above described method is also 
dependent on the availability of formal instruments in the form of regulations, 
interpersonal communications based on trust, knowledge of competition related issues 
by the competition authorities concerned, and the conditions which serve as a 
background for specific cases.  
One of the potentially effective methods for revealing cartels within the concept 
of joint handling of cartel cases, although some member states may not have provided 
for it, is primarily the guarantee for maintaining the secrecy of information to be 
revealed by the applicants. With regards to the implementation of cooperation, several 
countries set forth the legal basis directly for cooperation among authorities or 
jurisdictions, while others choose to set it out in the cooperation agreement with other 
jurisdictions. States can also potentially adopt regulations serving as “gateway” to 
other competition authorities in obtaining information in the course of investigation 
conducted by them.  
Despite the numerous success stories of cooperation among competition 
authorities in handling cartel cases, several challenges remain in the implementation 
thereof. Most national jurisdictions prohibit competition authorities from disclosing 
confidential information obtained from third parties in the process of investigation. 
Similarly, in the event of leniency applications the disclosure of such confidential 
information may have potential impact on the applicant’s safety. Other potential 
challenges may arise in view of disparities in the treatment of cartel prohibitions; 
                                                 
35Mokhamad Khoirul Huda et. al., “Harmonizing Competition Law In The Asean Economic 
Community”, International Journal of Business, Economics and Law, Vol. 9, April 4, 2016, p.50-51.  




namely some states treat cartels as criminal acts, while other states treat cartel cases 
based on administrative enforcement.38 On the other hand, competition authorities 
from administrative jurisdictions often find themselves in a better position to expand 
the methods of information cooperation. A variety of legal approaches is applied by 
different states; Indonesia, for instance, tends to be more inclined towards applying 
the rule of reason approach rather than the per se illegal approach.  
Harmonization at the regional level of the mechanism for proving cartels, 
followed by the adoption of rules serving as guidelines in handling cartels is the initial 
stage in the process undertaken by states in a region. The rules that need to be set out 
first of all related to cartels include the proceedings, among other things the hearing 
mechanism applied by authorities in examining business actors suspected of having 
engaged in cartel activities, the time frame for investigation and examination which is 
bound to have an impact on limiting the volume of documents and exhibits used by 
the prosecutor and defense, the scheme of leniency program, and the amount of 
sanctions in the form of fines.39 
However, even when competition authorities are in possession of the same 
evidence and information, the respective law enforcement agencies may end up 
making divergent decisions. Several countries in a certain region may appoint an 
institution for investigating cartels involving several competition jurisdictions. The 
ASEAN region, where almost all member states already have competition law 
instruments in place, should start thinking about the formation of such competition 
authority, based on common understanding, and with functions that would include the 
handling of cross-border cartel cases. Thus far, there has been a positive sign in the 
implementation of Indonesia’s Law No. 5/1999 by a Singaporean business actor. In 
the case involving a multinational company from Singapore, the company agreed to 
pay the fine imposed by KPPU, the Indonesian competition authority, after KPPU’s 
decision obtained final and binding force at the cassation level at the Supreme 
Court.40 
The potential challenges emerging in the process of institutional development 
are related to the disparities in the powers and functions of competition authorities, 
the capacity of human resources, and the legal approaches used, all of which are 
bound to affect the performance and effectiveness of cooperation. Similar is the case 
with the imposition of fines, in view of the fact that some states treat cartel cases 
under the criminal jurisdiction, while others treat them under the administrative 
jurisdiction, including the execution thereof. The establishment of ASEAN economic 
cooperation through AEC in 2015 reinvigorated the aspiration towards unifying 
competition policy and law among member states of the region. The formation of the 
forum of ASEAN competition authorities can be considered as a milestone in such 
cooperation. The initial purpose of promoting competition policy has developed by 
adopting competition laws in all member states.  
 
                                                 
38Philip Lowe, “Cartels, Fines, and Due Process”, The Online Magazine for Global Competition 
Policy (GCP), June 2009, Release Two, p.6.  
39Javier Ruiz Calzado and Gianni De Stefano, “Rights of Defense in Cartel Proceedings: Some 
Ideas for Manageable Improvements”, Latham & Watkins - Article Reprint, p.6-8, 
https://www.lw.com/thoughtLeadership/ rights-of-defense-in-cartel-proceedings, accessed January 16, 
2017. 




Based on the foregoing discussion on handling cartels in economic regions the 
following conclusions can be made: 
1. All member states in the region have agreed to handle cartels, in view of their 
highly damaging impact on consumers and the barrier to entry impact on 
potential new entrants to the market. Member states of the ASEAN Economic 
Region have agreed to join efforts in combating cartels by adopting anti-
monopoly legislation in their respective countries by the year 2015. Such 
agreement has been the embryo of cooperation in handling cartels. 
Harmonization efforts are bound to encounter challenges in the form of the 
existing divergent legal systems and approaches to cartels in the respective 
member states.  
2. Cooperation in handling cartels in the economic region requires harmonization 
by developing common understanding, which can be followed up by adopting 
competition regulations and a supervisory authority at the regional level. 
There is a need for trained human resources as well as clearly articulated rules 
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